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Thinking about critical methodology 
Robin Roslender, University of Dundee 
When the editors invited me to contribute an essay to this collection I had little 
difficulty in identifying a topic, one that I am sure had crossed Tony’s mind on many 
occasions. As an incomer to the emerging tradition of interdisciplinary and critical 
accounting research in 1985, a tradition that owes an immense debt to Tony, I soon 
recognised that my sociological imagination, initially configured in another Yorkshire 
university, had maybe found a hitherto unexpected outlet. In a couple of early 
contributions to the literature of interdisciplinary and critical accounting, I shared 
some of my understanding of the nuances of sociological theory, something I happily 
continue to the present time. But I was always conscious that, as exciting as social 
science theory and theorising are, Gouldner had long ago identified the lure that a 
“pilgrimage” to “a holy place” had for sociologists as they “grow old[er]”. Throughout 
my career I have taught my students about research methods and methodology, 
although never as much as I find myself doing these days. And, of course, I am not 
as young as I once was, so the time had come to actually write something about this 
topic. For Gouldner it was the need to recognise the myth of a value-free sociology. 
For Tony it was about stepping outside of the prevailing methodology of accounting 
research. For me it is about what I think critical methodology encompasses. 
Setting the scene 
Even for those readers who have experience of teaching modules on research 
methods and methodology in accounting, the term critical methodology is likely to be 
relatively unfamiliar. At the same time, however, they are likely to have broached the 
subject in some way or another, usually informed by insights first gleaned over thirty 
years ago from Burrell and Morgan’s seminal text Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisational Analysis. The normal procedure is to rehearse their arguments about 
the way in which the interpretive turn in sociology in the mid to late 1960s, and 
thereafter the sociology of organisations, allowed sociologists to develop a more 
genuinely social scientific approach to their endeavours than was possible within the 
prevailing functionalist paradigm, with its positivistic underpinnings. The discovery of 
a second sociology, to borrow Dawe’s 1970 imagery, promised to release a younger 
generation from the constraints imposed by continuing to ape the natural sciences, 
and implicitly the physical sciences, in attempting to fashion a science of society. 
Suddenly a varied prospectus of extant minority sociological ways of seeing, 
invariably linked in some way to the thinking of the most renowned of sociologists, 
Max Weber, became available to researchers. In due course, a small group of 
accounting researchers were to enthusiastically replicate the interpretive turn in 
sociology during the 1980s (Roslender, 2015).  
With the benefit of hindsight, Burrell and Morgan were in a position to recognise that 
sociology, and again the sociology of organisations, had experienced a second, 
parallel turn. They identified this as constituting the development of a generic 
sociology of radical change, which differed from both functionalist and interpretivist 
sociologies, now designated as the sociology of regulation. The sociology of radical 
change was defined by a commitment to make use of sociological insights to 
promote radical social change towards a better social order. In the same way that 
Weber was recognised to be the principal inspiration for interpretive sociologies, Karl 
Marx was cast to play a parallel role within the realms of radical sociology. Once 
again a plethora of minority radical sociologies was quickly explored within the study 
of organisations, to great effect, a process that a slightly larger group of accounting 
researchers also replicated during the 1980s.  
Within the sociology of radical change Burrell and Morgan drew attention to the 
existence of important distinctions, organised around the idea of structural and 
humanistic Marxism. They were very explicit that both designations incorporated 
significant variety, and at the margins, as captured on page 29 of the text, the 
differences might be argued as being very limited. Nevertheless, they were 
comfortable to emphasise the structural/humanistic dichotomy, identifying the former 
with contemporary Marxist social theorists such as Althusser and Coletti, while the 
within the humanistic ranks were members of the Frankfurt School, including its then 
(and now) dominant theorist, Jurgen Habermas.  
At this juncture it is useful to take a step backwards and recall how Burrell and 
Morgan constructed the other axis of their celebrated 2x2 matrix, as set out in the 
short opening chapter of their text. A continuum between subjective and objective 
social sciences is identified, being constituted by four sub-continua labelled: 
ontology; epistemology; human nature and methodology. Within this schema, 
“methodology” is asserted to be concerned with ideographic and nomothetic 
approaches to scientific explanation, perhaps best understood to refer to the 
formulation of particular explanations and law-like propositions respectively. As a 
consequence, the message that Burrell and Morgan are usually understood to 
provide to researchers is that when embracing a humanistic Marxist perspective the 
researcher is also rejecting a positivistic standpoint. By implication, those more 
attracted to structural Marxisms are less worried by the suggestion that their 
emphases may attract the pejorative positivistic label. Indeed it might be argued that 
the ends justify the means – social betterment through robust scientific enquiry.  
Returning to our point of departure, to the extent that the notion of critical 
methodology has any meaning within Burrell and Morgan’s tool box, it can refer 
either to radical positivism or radical interpretivism, or indeed some variant between 
these two extremes. If you think about it, not really very good guidance! 
Looking for clues? 
In one of the first papers to commend the development of a tradition of critical 
accounting research, Lowe and Tinker (1977) asserted that accounting, understood 
as both theory and practice, manifested an ideological blindness that they 
encouraged like-minded researchers to document. In doing so, they use the terms 
“accounting methodology” and “intellectual emancipation” in such a way as to 
impress upon readers that it was highly unlikely that continuing to research in 
accounting employing its prevailing positivistic methodology would challenge this 
ideological blindness and that it was now necessary to step outside of that 
methodology (= the project of intellectual emancipation) in order to do so. In other 
words, there was a need to fashion a critical methodology. Lowe and Tinker had 
come to recognise the negative consequences that a continued acceptance of the 
intellectual hegemony that married positivism, functionalism and conservatism would 
have for those who, like themselves, sought to develop a more socially and politically 
progressive accounting praxis.  
Although in the next years Burrell and Morgan’s text would provide members of the 
Sheffield School, among others, with many valuable insights towards progressing 
these objectives, Gallhofer et al (2013) identifies the rather less widely cited text by 
Bernstein (1976) as also being influential in this process, with both Laughlin and 
Chua extensively informed by him. Bernstein’s “critical theory of society” approach is 
heavily skewed in the direction of Habermas and Critical Theory, which aligns with 
humanistic Marxism in Burrell and Morgan’s taxonomy, and is thereby to be 
recognised to encompass a firm rejection of positivism and strong reservations about 
the interpretivist alternative. However, in common with Burrell and Morgan, Bernstein 
is largely silent on the detail of the methodological aspects of the preferred radical 
(critical) alternatives. 
Taken together, despite their key role in furnishing the initial foundations of the 
critical accounting research tradition, neither Burrell and Morgan nor Bernstein 
provide little actual insight as to the substance of the alternative methodology that 
Lowe and Tinker (1977) identify as being necessary to accomplish the desired 
intellectual emancipation from the prevailing ideological blindness of accounting 
theory and practice. More significantly, however, although close to forty years later 
we have an appreciation of what critical methodology is not, namely positivism or 
interpretivism, both of which, to invoke Marx’s own dictum, provide the means only to 
understand the world but not to change it, there remain relatively few clues about 
what critical methodology is, beyond the aforementioned suggestion of a continuum 
of variations involving radical positivism and radical interpretivism.  While this may 
not appear to have significantly compromised the development of a rich portfolio of 
critical accounting insights during the intervening years, a compelling case for 
returning to first principles exists.  
There is widespread consensus around the idea that methodology is concerned with 
the philosophy of (research) methods. It identifies and examines the various 
underpinnings of the many research methods or techniques that are available to 
researchers, as well as the issues associated with knowledge, knowing and the 
knowable. As a consequence, methodology is intimately associated with 
epistemology and ontology. At its simplest epistemology is concerned with the study 
of knowledge, or more specifically with questions about how we can know and what 
it is possible to know. The growth in interest within the social sciences, and 
particularly in sociology, with epistemological issues evident from the 1960s reflected 
a recognition that it was desirable for every researcher to have a necessary degree 
of awareness of the hidden underside of their practices, rather than leaving such 
matters to those colleagues who had elected to explore these hitherto abstract and 
arcane matters. Much the same motivations explain the parallel interest in ontology, 
understood to be concerned with that which is to be known, and more specifically the 
nature of being itself. While epistemology and ontology are readily understood to be 
complementary problematics, it is the latter that might be considered to be of 
marginally greater importance, on the grounds that it is important to know about what 
it is you are seeking to know about, prior to embarking on understanding the limits 
and possibilities of knowing. In this regard it is too easily forgotten that as recently as 
fifty years ago the predominant ontology informing social scientific enquiry held that 
there was no need to worry about whether what is to be known by either natural or 
social scientists is significantly different. As a consequence ‘positive knowledge’, the 
deliverable claimed by those who advocated a positivistic methodology, was a taken 
for granted. In this regard, the emergence of a viable alternative, in the guise of 
interpretivist methodology, always had significant implications beyond the social 
sciences.  
This, of course, returns to Burrell and Morgan’s own opposition within the sociology 
of regulation, functionalist versus interpretivist approaches to organisational analysis. 
At the extreme, the former incorporates a realist ontology and a positivist 
epistemology, in contrast to intepretivism’s nominalist (constructionist) ontology and 
hermeneutic (rather than an “anti-positivist”) epistemology. It also provides us with 
some general clues about what critical methodology might encompass, namely a 
critical epistemology coupled with a critical ontology. Although this might seem to be 
a fairly simplistic assertion, it has the merit of taking the discussion beyond the 
position that within the sociology of radical change it is possible to identify a 
continuum of such methodologies that reflect the same within the sociology of 
regulation. 
In order to proceed, it is preferable to begin by considering the notion of a critical 
epistemology. At its simplest such an epistemology would be characterised by an 
acceptance of the need to accomplish the pursuit of social betterment. In this respect 
a critical methodology consciously eschews the idea that knowledge might be 
understood in terms of objectivism and subjectivism, instead substituting the 
dismantling and abandonment of knowledges that justify and contribute to the 
reproduction of the status quo. What this assertion is not to be understood to imply is 
that it is possible to construct a true knowledge that serves to underpin some 
ultimate set of social arrangements. A critical epistemology might therefore be 
understood to be a negative epistemology, although once again not the polar 
opposite of a positive/ist epistemology. Critical epistemology seeks to promote what 
might be rather than what is, thereby being underpinned by an alternative vision of 
what ought to be, a characteristic it also shares with the prevailing hegemony. 
Critical epistemology’s negativity is therefore a radical negativity, since the 
knowledge it provides is at odds with that which currently holds sway. 
Critical ontology is concerned with the nature of what exists, or more precisely the 
contestable nature of what exists. Unlike ‘uncritical’ ontology, which incorporates a 
large measure of metaphysics and is characterised by a similar degree of 
abstractness, critical ontology focuses on the undesirable aspects of what is, as 
these are shaped by the prevailing hegemony. Critical ontology substitutes the 
debate about the existence of a real world ‘out there’ or the constructionist position 
that focuses on how that world is constructed through action, including research 
enquiry, with the observation that these two views are best understood to be 
reinforcing and, more significantly, give rise to highly contestable outcomes that 
critical social science seeks to reveal and disseminate in the form of emancipatory 
knowledge, i.e, knowledge that is consciously designed to promote social 
betterment. It is not that debating the merits of realism and positivism are without 
value, rather that what is to be recognised is that the constructed reality in its various 
manifestations does not serve the interests or the ends of the vast majority of those 
who construct, inhabit and reproduce it. 
Informed by these fundamental insights on the purview of critical epistemology and 
ontology, and thereby critical methodology, it becomes possible to identify a number 
of ideas that are already familiar to many critical accounting researchers and that 
merit being designated as aspects of critical methodology. 
Immanent critique 
The long established notion of immanent critique, or “immanent criticism” as it is 
sometimes referred to, provides a valuable point of departure. For commentators 
such as Held (1980) and Antonio (1981) immanent critique sits at the very heart of 
Marx’s method of analysis. Horkheimer, the writer from within the Marxist tradition 
who was to do as much as anyone to promote immanent criticism, said of it in 
Eclipse of Reason (1947) that it confronts “the existent, in its historical context, with 
the claim of its conceptual principles, in order to criticize the relation between the two 
and thus transcend them” (quoted in Held, 1980: 183). Held continues by 
commenting that following Marx, “Horkheimer argued that there is a contradiction 
between the bourgeois order’s ideas and reality, between its words and deeds.” 
(p183). Horkheimer is usually identified as being very firmly in the ranks of Critical 
Theory, serving as the Director of Institute of Social Research from 1930 until 1953, 
overseeing its relocation to the USA in the 1930s and it subsequent re-establishment 
at the University of Frankfurt in 1950. He is also identified as providing the widely 
influential characterisation of critical as opposed to “traditional theory”:  
“[C]ritical theory in its concept formation and in all phases of its development 
very consciously makes its own that concern for the rational organization of 
human activity which is its task to illumine and legitimate. For this theory is not 
concerned only with goals already imposed by existent ways of life, but with 
men and all their potentialities.” (Horkheimer, 1937, in Connerton, 1973: 223).   
Over time the precise detail of Horkheimer’s notion of immanent critique evolved, in 
some part as a consequence of his on-going collaboration with Adorno whose 
thinking on it was shaped by his own preferred research foci. Habermas, the 
principal inheritor of the legacy of the Frankfurt School also contributed to our 
understanding of the notion of immanent critique.   
Despite a very evident affinity between immanent critique and Critical Theory, it 
would be a great mistake to conclude that it should be understood to be somehow 
uniquely associated with it. The key observation is the assertion that immanent 
criticism sits at the very heart of Marx’s method and not simply Critical Theory. 
Earlier a distinction was made between Critical Theory and those Marxisms that are 
designated as being more structurally focused, i.e, between radical humanism and 
radical structuralism in Burrell and Morgan’s taxonomy. However, it is easy to 
overlook the observation that this distinction is principally adopted for analytical or 
taxonomic purposes. It is based on the differing emphases within the Marxist canon 
between the ideational and philosophical Marxist theory that is most readily evident 
within Critical Theory and the more materialistic and economistic emphases of 
associated with political economy, Burrell and Morgan’s contemporary 
Mediterranean Marxism, labour process theory, etc. In truth, while scholars tend to 
place great emphasis and significance on differences, some of which are arguably 
quite fundamental, there is much that the broad categorisation of Marxist theory 
shares in common. In this regard it might be remembered that, quite early in the 
development of critical accounting, Chua (1986) appeared comfortable utilising a 
single “critical” designation, echoing Hopper and Powell’s earlier identification of the 
emerging critical accounting research tradition as straddling both elements of Burrell 
and Morgan’s earlier opposition (Hopper and Powell, 1985). 
Horkheimer’s own focus on contradiction, identified by Held, confirms this. For many 
the concept resonates more readily with structural Marxism where it is often linked 
with that of over-determination, the pair being employed in tandem to explore the 
working through (out) of the ultimate unsustainability of the prevailing social order 
and its attendant distorting ideological justifications. A more Critical Theory oriented 
interpretation of the power of ideology emphasises the ways in which those whose 
interests it promotes, and seeks to represent as ‘the truth’ (or reality), are somewhat 
more robust than might otherwise be apparent. It is only by painstakingly applying 
the method of immanent critique, with its ultimate objective of securing a better or 
more open, egalitarian social order, that individuals will come to realise, through 
heightened self-awareness, as opposed to the more widely canvassed class 
consciousness, the fundamental shortcomings and constraints of the order that 
surrounds them. Neither emphasis is sufficient on its own, with immanent critique 
providing the critical theoretic glue that binds together the different but overlapping 
conceptual frameworks that a radical intellectual interventionism or theoretical 
practice has evolved.  
Immanent critique problematizes what is, subjecting the prevailing order, and those 
knowledges that have been devised to justify it, to scrutiny, through a process of 
dismantling (rather than deconstruction). No specific alternative order or knowledge 
is privileged, however, since there can be no ultimate state that will inevitably be 
achieved. Rather, immanent critique entails an exercise in analysing what exists by 
subjecting it to the claims that it makes for itself, while coming to understand what 
might be. In this respect, immanent critique is an exercise in coming to an 
awareness of the partiality of what exists, which in turn exists to be reconfigured 
through the process of resolving the inherent contradictions that lie at the core of the 
is of the capitalist social formation.   
Laughlin’s operationalisation of the critical theoretic  
An early engagement with the notion of critical methodology is found in Laughlin’s 
widely cited 1987 Accounting, Organizations and Society paper on studying 
accounting systems in organisational contexts. A member of the Sheffield School 
from its earliest days, Laughlin remains a central figure in promoting a Critical Theory 
perspective in accounting research, particularly the value of the work of Habermas, 
on which he draws in this paper. Laughlin is unequivocal that any attempt to employ 
Critical Theory in accounting research entails not only understanding how accounting 
functions. Such understandings are simply a precursor to change (“transformation”) 
for the better (“improvement”), an attribute that is not necessarily present in the 
alternative ways of seeing that had become increasingly commonplace in critical 
accounting research in the recent past. Laughlin’s brief introduction to the different 
approaches to Critical Theory identifiable with four of its key exponents – 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas – confirms that in their own ways they 
all sought to contribute to a better world for the humans who inhabit it, the generic 
project of social betterment that continues to motivate not only Critical Theorists but 
all those who subscribe to the practice of engaged enquiry.  
On page 485 Laughlin refers to Habermas holding “a seemingly less radical 
perspective” to his three predecessors. This is certainly at least a contestable 
assertion, although there is a considerable body of evidence to support the view that 
Habermas may have become personally less radical over his own lifetime. At the 
same time, Laughlin seems to be attracted to a more moderate radicalism, 
something that is subsequently clearly evident in two papers on accounting 
methodology published in 1995 and 2004 (see Roslender, 2013 for a discussion of 
Laughlin’s middle range thinking). Equally contentious is Laughlin’s translation of the 
precepts of Critical Theory, among which immanent critique is fundamental, to the 
level of an organisation or an accounting system, thereby fashioning a persuasive 
methodology. Laughlin asserts that this is not a problem for any of the 
aforementioned theorists, least of all Habermas whose model, in his view 
“has the greatest potential both as a methodological approach for 
understanding and changing accounting systems design and for investigating 
social phenomena more widely.” (Laughlin, 1987: 485).  
On balance perhaps, it is necessary to make a start somewhere. 
Laughlin’s account of Habermas’ methodology is based on insights that are to be 
found in the latter’s introductory essay to the fourth edition of his text Theory and 
Practice, originally published in 1971 and republished in an abridged form in 1974. 
Habermas’ insights are expanded by Laughlin to produce an operationalised 
methodological approach designed for the purpose of understanding and changing 
accounting in organisational contexts. The methodology is constituted by three 
stages, or four if the “quasi-ignorance” stage is included. Having gained access to an 
organisation, researchers are challenged to develop a working knowledge of how it 
currently functions, hence the term quasi-ignorance. Through a systematic process 
of exploration and enquiry, in which particular emphasis is placed upon looking 
beyond the observable reality, and via a process of discussion, the researcher seeks 
to identify what would appear to be the critical research questions or “critical 
theorems” to be pursued, as well as to develop an initial understanding of possible, 
progressive solutions to these questions. At this point the researcher should be 
sufficiently well apprised of the present organisational reality to move to the process 
of enlightenment stage. In essence this is the equivalent of the generic data 
collection stage, although of necessity very different. Reflecting Habermas’ broader 
commitment to promote a democratic mode of discussion designed to result in 
significant individual enlightenment, i.e., the ideal speech situation, the researcher 
and the researched engage in a lengthy period of discussion, designed to verify the 
former party’s informed assessment of the prevailing social arrangements and how 
these might be enhanced for the benefit of the researched. The third and final stage 
sees the researcher revisit her/his cumulative understanding in an attempt to codify 
the lessons learned. These in turn are shared with the researched with the intention 
of promoting a further round of democratic discussion and reflection designed to 
identify possible strategic initiatives towards a state of organisational betterment. It is 
not for the researcher to identify these initiatives, since it is not her/his organisational 
realities that are under scrutiny. Nor is the researcher to be accorded any superior 
capacity for understanding, despite an unavoidable technical expertise. 
It is difficult to avoid making sense of this methodology in terms of a very un-critical 
view of research. Ironically it is very tempting to bring to mind the generic 
management consultancy model of practice, which would see critical accounting 
researchers portrayed as a radical priesthood (of quackery?). Equally, it is possible 
to recognise a good measure of idealism at work. Taking a less cynical view, 
however, Laughlin’s portrayal of a critical (theoretic) methodology identifies a number 
of interesting attributes of any such methodology. Initially it is clear that such a 
methodology firmly eschews any pretensions of value neutrality. The objective of the 
exercise is the promotion of betterment for the majority of an organisation’s 
members, as befits something derived from the traditions of Marxist theory of 
whatever stripe. Secondly, embracing such a methodology is no casual undertaking, 
for beyond its radical underpinnings, it should be immediately evident that 
researchers are required to invest a significant amount of time in their enquiries. 
Thirdly, critical methodology fundamentally undermines the privilege that science has 
traditionally accorded those who practice it. While critical researchers do require to 
possess a significant stock of highly arcane, technical knowledge, their central role is 
that of facilitating others coming to know what might serve their interests better. It is 
arguably the combination of expertise and a commitment to facilitating a progressive 
utilisation of a much wider range of knowledges that is crucial. Finally, the discursive 
process through which theory becomes translated into practice affirms that, as an 
instance of critical social science, critical methodology demonstrates the significance 
that language plays in the contemporary social development process. 
Critical realism 
It might be argued that, strictly speaking, Laughlin’s contribution is one of a critical 
methodology, i.e., a potential operationalisation of the intentions implicit within the 
idea of a critical theoretic (or critical social science) approach to enquiry. In 
comparison, critical realism (CR) can be understood as an example of critical 
methodology in the generic sense, and as the counterpart to positivism on the one 
hand and interpretivism on the other. The relative absence, to date, of much interest 
in what CR has to offer critical accounting research (or accounting research in 
general) is surprising, not least in the light of a continuing fascination with the 
prospectus of method or framing theories that might be embraced for research 
purposes.    
Although many of the ideas underpinning CR had long been understood within the 
philosophy of science, it is generally accepted that Bhaskar’s 1975 A Realist Theory 
of Science provides a crucial moment in its evolution. Initially Bhaskar advanced a 
general philosophy of science, termed transcendental realism, which he extended to 
the social and human sciences in the guise of critical naturalism in 1979. Bhaskar 
fashions a three tier ontology distinguishing between the real, which is constituted by 
generative mechanisms, the actual, which is how these mechanisms manifest 
themselves in specific (actual) events, and the empirical, which is how events, and 
thus the existence of generative mechanisms, are experienced by individuals, 
including researchers. While sharing positivism’s assumption that a real world exists 
‘out there’, independent of and pre-existing our knowledge of it, for Bhaskar 
transcendental realism problematises positivism’s failure to recognise the conditions 
that necessarily exist in respect of what it is possible to know about and, in turn, 
impact reality. In the case of the social sciences, the pre-existence of an external 
social reality, in the form of a social structure constituted by generative mechanisms, 
knowledge of which is extensively organised, again acts as a powerful constraint 
upon human agency. CR, a term neither coined nor initially employed by Bhaskar 
himself, and understood as the elision of transcendental realism and critical 
naturalism, has major implications for projects of human self-emancipation, including 
a “socialist emancipation” (Bhaskar, 1989: vii). Since human agency is inherently 
endowed with the capacity for reflexivity, the possibility of transformation rather than 
simply and continuously accommodating to the present social order, is potentially 
ever present. Bhaskar (1989) is aware of the clear affinity that exists between CR, as 
he had developed it over the previous decade and a half, and Critical Theory, 
identifying Marx’s Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach as one of two quotations at the 
head of his “Preface” to Reclaiming Reality. 
In terms of epistemology, CR holds that what we can know about the (external) 
social world can only be partial since it is not possible to fully understand the 
workings of the generative mechanisms that constitute it. In this regard human 
agency lives its life making sense of reality, to varying degrees and with differing 
consequences. More significantly, however, when individuals do come into contact 
with the external reality they bring with them an accumulated understanding of it that 
necessarily shapes all subsequent interactions with it and that organises or 
structures these interactions and thereby the accumulated experience carried 
forward. The default position is that normal interaction constitutes a reproduction of 
the status quo, although in principle it is always conceivable that clichéd ‘life 
changing experiences’ can occur. In the case of social enquiry, the same principles 
apply. In the case of the researcher, an accumulated knowledge of reality pre-
conditions them to think and act in particular ways, including choosing what to 
explore and how to do so. Once again, the default position is that of enquiries giving 
rise to outcomes that reinforce and reproduce the status quo. Crucially, however, it is 
always possible to import alternative knowledges and insights into the research 
process, particularly those that are underpinned by a commitment to promote a 
different reality. These will necessarily shape any interaction with reality and 
resultant understandings, which have the consequence of reinforcing the initial way 
of seeing. In common with Marx’ Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach or Critical Theory (or 
Habermas’ critical social science) CR asserts that a commitment to such engaged 
enquiry is to be recognised as a virtue. Objectivity or value neutrality are explicitly 
eschewed in the pursuit of transformational insights, while the Weberian notion of 
value relevance is rejected in favour of something more robust. 
This brief characterisation of CR is rather different from the one that is usually found 
within the accounting research literature, which in large part is informed by the 
formulation in which it has been embraced in the organisation and management 
studies literature rather than Bhaskar’s work. Reed (2005) provides an influential 
introduction to CR for such research, identifying it as a means of transcending the 
positivism vs postpositivism (methodologies) dichotomy within social scientific 
enquiry. By that time the postpositivism referred more to postmodern and post-
structural thinking than to interpretivism, with a generic constructionism providing the 
link between them. Modell, one of the few accounting researchers to engage at any 
length with CR, was initially reliant on the latter conceptualisation, identifying CR as 
“a potential way of bridging the polarized positions of the functionalist and 
interpretive paradigms” (Modell, 2009: 209). In doing so it provides a methodological 
underpinning for empirical researchers seeking to pursue triangulated, mixed 
methods research, a notion somewhat far removed from CR as an emancipatory 
methodology (see also Modell, 2007, 2010). Subsequently Modell (2014) has 
pursued a more wide-ranging exploration of the promise of CR, which also 
incorporates a discussion of a number of key distinctions within the broader 
literature, inter alia the support for a less critical CR orientation, plus a review of how 
accounting researchers have made use of this literature to date.  
Bourdieu    
Since the mid 1990s critical accounting research has evidenced as major shift in 
emphasis as a result of an increasing dominance of what might be designated 
postcritical thinking. Echoing what was observed at the beginning of this essay, like 
‘critical’, postcritical is a highly contestable descriptor, not least because the 
theoretical canon that it is applied to is clearly very diverse. At the present time, the 
work of three French social theorists continues to be highly influential. Foucault has 
been a fixture within critical accounting research almost from its inception, initially 
regarded by some as offering both important continuities with and insightful 
refinements of the traditions of Marxist theory. Over time, however, Foucault’s 
politically radical promise has been decoupled from an increasingly rich conceptual 
framework that has been unpacked by his many acolytes. Latour has rarely been 
regarded in the former light, initially attracting interest at the beginning of the 1990s 
principally because of a similar, and in part shared, conceptual framework to that of 
Foucault. Together Foucault and Latour offer the underpinnings of a postmodern 
(and postcritical) sociology that takes process as its principal emphasis as means to 
circumvent the structure/agency opposition that shaped the various traditions of 
modernist sociology. 
Bourdieu’s entree to critical accounting research occurred a decade later. In a review 
of its initial impact, Malsch et  al (2011) identify early papers by Kurunmaki (1999), 
Neu et al (2001) and Ramirez (2001), which in turn affirmed that like both Foucault 
and Latour, Bourdieu had an extensive corpus of work from which to draw. In an 
appendix to In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, Delsaut 
identifies a compendium of outputs dating back to 1958 (Bourdieu, 1990). Malsch et 
al enthusiastically commend the increased enrolment of Bourdieu’s work by critical 
accounting researchers, despite the very obvious difficulties that such an extensive 
legacy (predominantly published in a foreign language) presents. At the same time, 
they are worried by the emergence of a form of Bourdieu-lite, challenging their 
colleagues to embrace his work “holistically”. More significantly, however, they are 
critical of the lack of political engagement evident in many of the Bourdieusian 
studies they review (Malsch et al, 2011: 220). In their view, Bourdieu should present 
no problems to those within the critical accounting research community who remain 
committed to the philosophy of praxis. This being the case, and bearing in mind a 
career long involvement with empirical enquiry, what insights does Bourdieu provide 
in respect of critical methodology? 
Bourdieu’s methodological approach is termed social praxeology (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992; Everett, 2002, 2016). It is firmly focused on epistemological 
concerns and in particular the epistemology adopted by the researcher. Initially 
Bourdieu requires the researcher(s) to reflect thoroughly upon her/his knowledge of 
any chosen research object in order to introduce a necessary distance between 
her/his extant working knowledge of that object. One way to characterise such 
practice is as an intellectual sorbet that is designed to cleanse the mind of the 
unfounded pre-conceptions or pre–conditions that might compromise subsequent 
enquiries. Grenfell (2010) identifies the second stage of Bourdieu’s methodology as 
being constituted by three sub-stages that require the researcher to determine the 
topography of power resources within the chosen field (or space) for exploration, to 
establish the actual distribution of these resources, and thereafter the specific 
dispositions of the key actors within the field under scrutiny. As in the previous stage, 
Bourdieu challenges the researcher to continuously reflect upon how s/he 
understands all of these arrangements. The third and final stage, termed participant 
objectivation, entails the further, reflexive elucidation of the detailed insights 
attendant on the pursuit of the research enquiry. For Bourdieu this stage, as with the 
two previous stages, is best accomplished by means of a collective practice as a 
result of which researchers are regarded as being less likely to regress into an 
unreflexive state of taken for granted interpretations. 
The pursuit of social betterment, understood as the promotion of the interests of the 
mass of society, is taken as axiomatic by Bourdieu. Throughout his life he was firmly 
committed to the production of knowledge for such purposes, continuously seeking 
to ensure that his insights were of utility to political activists and militants, regularly 
aligning himself with their actions and interventions. In the final decade of his life 
Bourdieu’s radicalism became increasingly pronounced. During these years he 
explored the concept of the collective intellectual, arguing that radical intellectuals 
from different backgrounds and spaces (habitus) should recognise that their 
contributions were most challenging when understood as elements of a collective 
practice, i.e., the work of the collective intellectual (Cooper and Coulson, 2014; see 
also Shenkin and Coulson, 2007). In the case of academics like Bourdieu, crucial to 
this praxis (or praxeology) is the application of the highest standards of intellectual 
rigour, which provide the necessary (and credible) substitute for the traditional 
precept of objectivity, now to be recognised as the defining attribute of uncritical 
social science.   
 
By way of a conclusion 
In the process of revising and refining these pages over a period of eight months I 
have become conscious of a number of things. The first of these is that I don’t really 
think that I have told many readers anything particularly new. The great majority of 
the content is familiar to most critical accounting researchers. The novelty, if such 
there is here, is how I have put these various insights together to create a depiction 
of what critical methodology is. A second lesson I have learned is one that is very 
similar to something I have sought to convey to my own students in early years cost 
and management classes – don’t seek short cuts to understanding. I now recognise 
that I have long been in pursuit of a depiction of critical methodology that can readily 
be understood as an extension of the positivist/interpretivist couple, thereby creating 
a triptych. Critical methodology is different – not least because three-sided coins 
don’t exist. The third insight is that as valuable as Marx’s Eleventh Thesis on 
Feuerbach or any similar advocacy of the pursuit of the philosophy of praxis might 
be, its essentially rhetorical quality means that its purchase remains largely confined 
to the realm of social theory or social philosophy. As a consequence, while both 
critical theory (rather than Critical Theory) and critical methodology seek to promote 
progress towards social betterment, they do so in different, if complementary ways, 
each of which needs to be understood in its own terms. This observation in turn 
informs a final realisation, that the fundamental attribute of critical methodology is the 
rejection of any pretence of value freeness, value neutrality, objectivity, 
disinterestedness or similar prescription that a bona fide scientist is urged to 
embrace in the pursuit of their research activities. Such a stance has long been 
recognised to be difficult to justify in a blanket fashion even across the natural 
sciences, thereby adding weight to those within the social sciences who identify the 
enactment of the highest order of rigour in enquiry as providing the basis for the 
credibility of their own scientific practices. Seeking to change the world is not inimical 
to being a scientist of any type. The grounds for disqualification reside elsewhere.        
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